In this paper, I examine how competitors respond to their peer firms’ sexual scandals. When a firm experiences a scandal, stakeholders tend to categorize its competitors and make generalizations of judgments since firms in similar situations may have encountered similar issues. Competitors of the scandal-stricken firm may take actions to assuage stakeholder concerns and mitigate potential negative spillover effects. I examine two possible reactions that are closely related to the common nature of sexual scandals—that is, the victims in most sexual scandals are women. One mechanism is more like cheap talks—i.e., promoting pro-women claims on their social media, and the other mechanism is a more substantive action—i.e., increasing the number of female directors on their boards. Using a difference-in-difference approach to analyze sexual scandals in the United States between 1999 and 2019, I find that competitors of a firm affected by a sex scandal exhibit a higher level of pro-women claims and female director appointments in the post-scandal period than in the pre-scandal period. Furthermore, these effects are amplified by the competitors’ size similarity with the scandal firm, the competitors’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reputation, their analyst coverage, and their community liberalism. This study can contribute to the literature on organizational responses to misconduct and inter-organizational spillover effects.