Conventional political risk theories assume that host-country governments led by right-wing parties pose less risk to investments made by multinational enterprises (MNEs) and domestic firms. We challenge that convention by developing a framework adding populist political risk assumptions which emphasizes anti-foreign investor policy priorities. Populism prompts a “right-wing shift,” increasing risk for MNEs relative to domestic firms. We document support for this theorized shift through capital structure analyses of 596 investment projects announced for construction and operation in 27 European countries from 1990-2020. MNE and domestic projects financed with less equity are indicative of less investment risk when announced in host countries with governments led by right-wing parties. When recent elections see increased vote shares for right-wing populist parties, follow-on domestic projects again include less equity, but MNE projects include more equity, indicative of higher investment risk. This paper makes two contributions to the burgeoning literature on populism and political risk for firms based on their ownership structure. Theoretically, we identify important boundary conditions for populist party influence related to partisan orientation. Empirically, we identify alternative methods for assessing populist party influence on government policies related to recent electoral outcomes.